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AFRICAN POLYGAMY: PAST AND PRESENT
JAMES FENSKE
ABSTRACT. Motivated by a simple model, I use DHS data to test nine hypotheses about
the prevalence and decline of African polygamy. First, greater female involvement in agri-
culture does not increase polygamy. Second, past inequality better predicts polygamy
today than does current inequality. Third, the slave trade only predicts polygamy across
broad regions. Fourth, modern female education does not reduce polygamy. Colonial
schooling does. Fifth, economic growth has eroded polygamy. Sixth and seventh, rain-
fall shocks and war increase polygamy, though their effects are small. Eighth, polygamy
varies smoothly over borders, national bans notwithstanding. Finally, falling child mor-
tality has reduced polygamy.
This version: September 28, 2012
1. INTRODUCTION
Polygamy remains common in much of Africa.1 In the “polygamy belt” stretching
from Senegal to Tanzania, it is common for more than one third of married women to be
polygamous (Jacoby, 1995). Polygamy has been cited as a possible contributor to Africa’s
low savings rates (Tertilt, 2005), widespread incidence of HIV (Brahmbhatt et al., 2002),
high levels of child mortality (Strassmann, 1997), and of female depression (Adewuya
et al., 2007).2 This is despite a striking decline in the prevalence of polygamy in Africa
over the last half century. In Benin, more than 60% of women in the sample used for
this study who were married in 1970 are polygamists, while the figure for those married
in 2000 is under 40%.3 This is also true of Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Senegal. Several
other countries in the data have experienced similar erosions of polygamy. This is an
evolution of marriage markets as dramatic as the rise in divorce in the United States or
the decline of arranged marriage in Japan over the same period.
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I use data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) on women from 34 coun-
tries to test nine hypotheses about the prevalence and decline of polygamy in sub-
Saharan Africa. These are motivated by a simple model, and by previous theories and
findings from economics, anthropology, and African history. These hypotheses test
whether polygamy responds to economic incentives, economic shocks, and the gen-
eral process of economic development. First, Jacoby (1995) has linked the demand for
wives in the Ivory Coast to the productivity of women in agriculture. I find, by con-
trast, that polygamy is least common in those parts of Africa where women have his-
torically been most important in agriculture. Second, economists since Becker (1974)
have linked polygamy to inequality between men. I am not able to find any correla-
tion between wealth inequality recorded in the DHS and the probability that a woman
is polygamous. I find, however, that historical inequality predicts polygamy today. Sim-
ilarly, geographic predictors of inequality that have been used in other studies also pre-
dict the existence of polygamy in the present. Third, I confirm the result of Dalton and
Leung (2011); greater slave trade exposure does predict polygamy today. I show, how-
ever, that the result depends on a broad comparison of West Africa to the rest of the
continent.4
Fourth, I exploit two natural experiments that have increased female education in
Nigeria (Osili and Long, 2008) and Zimbabwe (Agu¨ero and Ramachandran, 2010), and
find no causal effect of women’s schooling on polygamy. By contrast, I use colonial data
from Huillery (2009) and Nunn (2011) to show that schooling investments decades ago
predict lower polygamy rates today. Fifth, I find an impact of greater levels income per
capita on the decline in polygamy. I follow Miguel et al. (2004), and use country-level
rainfall as an instrumental variable. Sixth, I find that local economic shocks predict
polygamy; women within a survey cluster who received unfavorable rainfall draws in
their prime marriageable years are more likely to marry a polygamist. Seventh, war acts
like a detrimental rainfall shock at the local level, increasing the prevalence of polygamy.
Both of these effects, however, are small in magnitude. Eighth, I use a regression discon-
tinuity design to test whether national bans and other country-level efforts have played
any role in the decline of African polygamy. With a few notable exceptions, I find that
they have not. Finally, I use national-level differences in differences and a natural ex-
periment from Uganda to test for an effect of falling child mortality. The magnitudes
I find are large enough to explain a meaningful decline in polygamy in several African
countries.
I find, first, that existing theories of polygamy face challenges in explaining Africa.
Inequality is related to polygamy, but acts over the very long term. The distribution of
polygamy in Africa does not fit an explanation rooted in the gender division of labor.
Educating women in the present does not spur men to demand “higher quality” wives,
4I became aware of their paper while working on this project. They were first, but replication is good for
science.
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as in Gould et al. (2008). Second, I find that history matters. Pre-colonial inequality, the
slave trade, and colonial education matter in the present. Third, African marriage mar-
kets have responded to economic growth and fluctuations, but the largest elasticities
that I find are in response to changes in child health.
My results contribute to our knowledge of the determinants of ethnic institutions. In-
stitutions such as pre-colonial states and land tenure matter for modern incomes (Gold-
stein and Udry, 2008; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2012). Shared institutions facil-
itate collective action within ethnic groups, while ethnic inequality lowers incomes to-
day (Alesina et al., 2012; Glennerster et al., 2010; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). Although an
empirical literature has explained national institutions as products of influences such
as settler mortality, population, trade, or suitability for specific crops (Acemoglu et al.,
2001, 2002, 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997), less is known about the origins of eth-
nic institutions. Like national institutions, these may have their basis in biogeograph-
ical endowments such as population pressure or ecologically-driven gains from trade
(Fenske, 2012; Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2012). I add to this literature by testing hy-
potheses about the origin of one specific ethnic institution, and by identifying variables
that influence its persistence and evolution.
My results also add to our understanding of the working of marriage markets and
family structures. These matter for several outcomes, including female schooling (Field
and Ambrus, 2008), sex selection (Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010), child health (Bharad-
waj and Nelson, 2012), labor force participation and geographic mobility (Alesina and
Giuliano, 2010), and women’s access to capital (Goyal et al., 2010). Several recent con-
tributions have explained marriage patterns using the gender division of labor created
by influences such as the plough (Alesina et al., 2011), animal husbandry (Voigtla¨nder
and Voth, 2011), natural resource wealth (Ross, 2008), or deep tillage (Carranza, 2012).
Other views link marital rules to risk-sharing arrangements (Rosenzweig, 1993; Rosen-
zweig and Stark, 1989). Dowries and bride prices respond to population growth (Rao,
1993), the costs of contraception (Arunachalam and Naidu, 2010), pressures to main-
tain fidelity (Nunn, 2005), and exogenous legal changes (Ambrus et al., 2010). A small
number of papers exist that examine the origins of polygamy, including Adshade and
Kaiser (2008), Tertilt (2005) and Gould et al. (2008). In this paper, I reassess some of
the most influential explanations of African polygamy using microeconomic evidence,
and propose new contributing factors. I uncover a dramatic transition in the continent’s
marriage markets, and assess some plausible explanations for this change.
I also touch on a variety of other literatures, including the importance of inequality for
development (Easterly, 2007; Putterman and Weil, 2010), the implications of the gender
division of labor (Alesina et al., 2011; Qian, 2008), the impacts of the slave trade (Nunn,
2008), the effects of war (Annan and Blattman, 2010; Blattman and Miguel, 2010), the
ability of poor households to cope with economic shocks (Townsend, 1994), and the
capacity of African states (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007).
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In section 2, I outline the hypotheses that I test, presenting a simple model to moti-
vate them. I discuss other possible hypotheses that are not the focus of this paper in
Appendix A. In section 3, I describe the tests that I apply to each of these hypotheses. I
introduce the multiple data sources that I use in section 4, and I provide additional de-
tails on these sources in the Web Appendix. I report the results in section 5. Additional
robustness checks and supporting results are listed in in Appendix A and are described
in detail in the Web Appendix. In section 6, I conclude.
2. HYPOTHESES
2.1. Model. I begin with a simple model that motivates the hypotheses that I test. This
builds on work by Bergstrom (1994), Lagerlo¨f (2010), and Tertilt (2005). This motivates
the empirical tests within a unified framework. Not every outcome is novel. For ex-
ample, the link between inequality and polygamy goes back to Becker (1974). This
model cannot explain all stylized facts in the data. Increasing incomes predict greater
polygamy in the model, but less polygamy in the data. The purpose of the model, then,
is to demonstrate that the hypotheses I test are theoretically relevant. Further, I derive
predictions predictions that differ from some existing models of polygamy; this estab-
lishes that there is theoretical ambiguity that must be resolved empirically.
2.1.1. Setup. A community consists of N men and their sisters. There are two periods.
In the first period, men trade their endowments of wealth and sisters in return for wives.
In the second period, they make decisions about consumption, fertility, and the human
capital of their children. A fraction pi of men is rich, and a fraction 1 − pi is poor. Rich
men begin with wealth equal to yR =
(
1 + θ(1−pi)
pi
)
y, while poor men begin with wealth
yP = (1− θ) y. This formulation allows the parameter θ to measure inequality without
affecting mean wealth y. Each man has s sisters, which captures the sex ratio.
Women are homogenous, divisible, and make no decisions. Wives are valuable as
farmers, for producing children, and for educating those children. In the first period,
the price of a woman is b, which is determined endogenously. Each price-taking man
receives income bs in return for the sisters that he sells, and pays bw for the wives that
he buys. Men receive utility from consumption c, fertility n, and the human capital of
their children hi, such that:
(1) U = (1− β) ln(c) + βln(hin).
Fathers choose either high human capital or low human capital for their children,
such that hi ∈ {hL, hH}. Rearing n children with human capital hi andw wives costs γi n2w .
γi is a cost parameter. Because it is costly to raise a higher-quality child, γH > γL > 0.
The costs of an increasing number of births for any one wife are convex, for example
through depletion of her health.
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Each wife farms, creating income ρ for her husband. ρ captures female agricultural
productivity. In equilibrium, it will be the case that b > ρ. Thus, a man of type j ∈ {R,P}
with w wives and n children of quality hi will consume c = yj − (b − ρ)w − γi n2w . Each
man’s problem can be written as:
(2) V = max
{w,n,hi}
{
(1− β) ln
(
yj + bs− (b− ρ)w − γin
2
w
)
+ βln(hin)
}
.
2.1.2. Optimization. (2) can be solved from its first-order conditions. These yield each
man’s demand for wives and optimal number of children:
(3) w∗j =
β(yj + bs)
2(b− ρ) ,
and
(4) n∗j =
β(yj + bs)
2
√
γi(b− ρ)
.
Substituting (4) and (3) into (2) gives utility conditional on a choice of human capital.
A man will choose to provide his children with human capital hH if the relative cost is
sufficiently low. That is:
(5) h∗i = hH if
(
hH
hL
)2
≥ γL
γH
.
2.1.3. Equilibrium. Total demand for wives will be N(piw∗R + (1− pi)w∗P ). Total supply of
wives will be Ns. Using (3), this gives equilibrium bride price b:
(6) beqm =
2ρs+ βy
(2− β)s .
Define p˜i ≡ 1−pi
pi
. Substituting (6) into (3), the equilibrium numbers of wives possessed
by rich and poor men are:
(7) weqmR =
βs
2
(
(2− β)(1 + p˜iθ)y + ρs
βy + ρs
+ 1
)
,
and
(8) weqmP =
βs
2
(
(2− β)(1− θ)y + ρs
βy + ρs
+ 1
)
.
Define R as the relative number of wives married by rich and poor men. This is:
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(9) R ≡ w
eqm
R
weqmP
=
(2 + (2− β)p˜iθ)y + ρs
(2− (2− β)θ)y + ρs .
Because the mean number of wives is determined by the sex ratio, s, it makes sense to
think of R as an index of relative polygamy. The fraction of women who are married to
rich men is increasing inR. In the remainder of this section, I use this model to generate
predictions that motivate the hypotheses I test.
2.2. The gender division of labor. Jacoby (1995), building on Boserup (1970), shows
that the demand for wives is greatest in those parts of the Ivory Coast where female
productivity in agriculture predicted by crop mixes is highest. Although women are
more important in agriculture where they are more productive (Alesina et al., 2011),
the model does not predict that this will increase polygamy. Though greater productiv-
ity ρ increases the demand for women in (3), supply is held constant. In (9), ∂R
∂ρ
< 0.
Increasing the productivity of women in agriculture reduces polygamy. The increase in
ρ raises the purchasing power of both rich men and poor men, since their endowments
of sisters have both increased in value. This reduces the disparity in purchasing power,
hence, polygamy.
2.3. Inequality. The model predicts that inequality increases polygamy. From (9), ∂R
∂θ
>
0. This echoes Becker (1974), who argues that total output can be raised by giving a
more productive man a second wife than by giving her to a “less able” man. Similarly,
Bergstrom (1994) models polygamy as a consequence of inequality in male endowments
of both wealth and sisters. This may not hold as a society develops; Lagerlo¨f (2010) sug-
gests that a self-interested ruler may impose monogamy at later stages of development
to prevent his own overthrow by lesser men deprived of wives.
2.4. The slave trade. The slave trade can be thought of in at least two ways in the model.
The first is as an increase in the sex ratio, s. This will increase the number of wives
for rich and poor men, given in (7) and (8). However, ∂R
∂s
< 0. A larger endowment of
sisters for both rich and poor men will reduce inequality in wives. I show in the Web
Appendix that the sex ratio helps explain polygamy today by showing that polygamy is
is more common in areas closer to mines, where labor is generally provided by migrant
men. A second approach to the slave trade gives the opposite result. Because those who
profited from the slave trade did so at the expense of others, it increased inequality (θ).
This would increase R.
That the slave trade may have increased polygamy is an old argument – see Thorn-
ton (1983). In addition to its effects on inequality and the sex ratio, it created movable
wealth that may have facilitated a transition from matrilocal to patrilocal marriage, al-
lowing non-sororal polygamy to exist (Schneider, 1981). Whatley and Gillezeau (2011)
and Edlund and Ku (2011) show correlations between slave exports and polygamy at the
ethnicity and country levels, respectively. Dalton and Leung (2011) also use DHS data
AFRICAN POLYGAMY: PAST AND PRESENT 7
to test whether the slave trade predicts polygamy today. I confirm their result using dif-
ferent methods. I take women as the unit of observation, rather than men, and match
women to slave exports by location in addition to matching by ethnicity. I show these
results are robust to adding Angola, which exported more slaves than any other country,
but has low polygamy rates today. I add the caveat that the slave trade can only predict
polygamy across broad regions.
2.5. Female education. The expansion of female schooling from the late colonial pe-
riod until the 1980s was dramatic across much of Africa (Schultz, 1999). Empowering
women through education may encourage them to avoid polygamous marriage. Alter-
natively, Gould et al. (2008) suggest that a rich man intent on increasing child quality
will prefer one educated wife to several uneducated ones. The model, however, gives
different predictions. If educating women makes it easier for them to raise educated
children, reducing γH , it will have no effect on polygamy, though it may induce a switch
from low-quality to high-quality children, as in (5). This differs from the result in Gould
et al. (2008), because women here are homogenous. This suggests that the effects of
mass education programs like the ones I exploit as natural experiments will differ from
those that have unequal impacts. By contrast, histories of missionary education exert
persistent influence on attitudes towards democracy (Woodberry, 2012) and the posi-
tion of women (Nunn, 2011); it is possible that these have had a similar effects on atti-
tudes towards polygamy.
2.6. Economic growth. If polygamy is simply a condition of poverty, it should be dis-
appearing most rapidly in the countries that have grown most. Further, rising incomes
may induce a shift in parental efforts away from the quantity to the quality of children
(Galor and Weil, 2000), lowering the demand for multiple wives (Gould et al., 2008). The
model reveals that other mechanisms may counter this effect. Here, an increase in y
will increase the fraction of wives held by the rich: ∂R
∂y
> 0. The increase in y raises the
importance of monetary wealth relative to wealth in sisters, increasing the advantage of
rich men in the marriage market. The distribution of income gains, then, will matter.
2.7. Economic shocks. I test whether rainfall shocks at the survey cluster level predict
whether a woman will marry polygamously. Since many African societies pay bride
price, an adverse shock may encourage a girl’s parents to marry her to a worse man
in order to smooth consumption. Even without bride price, this may allow her parents
to remove a dependant or gain ties with another household able to offer support. Since
polygamist men tend be wealthier, they are better able to buy a wife in depressed con-
ditions. In the model, if poor men see their incomes fall more than richer men, this will
act like an increase in θ, increasing R. If, instead, incomes fall generally, this decline in
y will reduce the extent of polygamy.
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2.8. War. Warfare might increase polygamy through several mechanisms. In the model,
it would be expected to operate through the same channels as a local economic shock,
as well as by increasing s, the sex ratio. Becker (1974) cites a nineteenth-century war that
killed much of the male population of Paraguay and was followed by a rise in polygamy.
The BBC has suggested that polygamy is a coping strategy for war widows in Iraq,5 while
the OECD has made similar claims about Angola.6 Historically, warfare has existed as a
means for capturing women from neighboring ethnic groups (White and Burton, 1988).
2.9. National policies. Polygamy was banned by law in the Ivory Coast in 1964, but
polygamy remains widespread there. Despite the apparent failure of similar bans in
other countries, it is possible that other policies that vary at the national level may have
affected polygamy. These could include democratization, the legal status of women, or
the provision of health and education. The model suggests that only some policies will
matter. For example, some countries might provide better education, lowering γH , but
having no effect on polygamy. Alternatively, countries with national bans that increase
the costs of polygamy could be seen as levying a fine on wives greater than s. This would
have the effect of dampening demand for wives from richer men, reducing bride-price
and relative polygamy R.
I use a regression discontinuity design to test whether polygamy rates break at the
borders in my sample. Other studies of Africa have found that government invest-
ments such as education and health have effects that change discontinuously across
national borders (Cogneau et al., 2010; Cogneau and Moradi, 2011). Imported insti-
tutions such as local government can have long-lasting effects, even after the border
disappears (Berger, 2009). By contrast, indigenous institutions such as rights over land
pass smoothly over national borders (Bubb, 2009).
2.10. Child mortality. In the model, child mortality could be seen as an increase in γL
and γH , the costs of children. Under the assumptions above, child mortality will change
fertility, but not the total number of wives. Other models of fertility preference might
give other results. This is a result of the assumptions made about utility and the costs
of fertility; I show in the Web Appendix that a simplified model with quasilinear util-
ity gives the result that greater levels of child mortality increase polygamy if the extent
of inequality is not too great. This follows a simple intuition; if polygamy is a mecha-
nism for men to increase their fertility (e.g. Iliffe (1995); Tertilt (2005)) a reduction in
the probability that any one child will die reduces number of wives needed to achieve a
given number of surviving children.
5http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12266986
6http://genderindex.org/country/angola
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3. TESTS
The econometric tests that I use to test these hypotheses vary according to whether
the potential cause of polygamy is time-invariant, varies over time, can be tested with a
regression discontinuity, or can be tested using a natural experiment.
3.1. Time-invariant causes of polygamy. Several hypotheses concern the effects of time-
invariant variables on polygamy. Historical inequality is one. For hypotheses of this
type, my basic specification is:
(10) polygamousi = z
′
iβ + x
′
iγ + δCR + i.
Here, polygamousi is an indicator for whether woman i is in a polygamous marriage.
zi is the vector of controls of interest – for example her ethnic group’s gender division of
labor, or her survey cluster’s suitabilities for growing certain crops. xi is a vector of indi-
vidual and geographic controls. δCR is a country-round fixed effect. i is error. Standard
errors are clustered at the level at which the variables of interest (zi) vary. I use ordinary
least squares (OLS) to estimate (10). Where I have instruments for zi, I use instrumental
variables (IV).
The variables that are available to include in xi differ across the 90 DHS data sets that
I compile, and so I use only a limited set of individual-level controls. These are: year
of birth, year of birth squared, age, age squared, dummies for religion, and urban. I am
able to include both year of birth and age because the DHS surveys were conducted in
multiple years, though the linear term disappears with country-round fixed effects.
I include geographic controls in xi, to capture other determinants of polygamy that
may be correlated with zis. These are: absolute latitude; suitability for rain-fed agri-
culture; malaria endemism; ruggedness; elevation; distance to the coast, and dummies
for ecological zone (woodland, forest, mosaic, cropland, intensive cropland, wetland,
desert, water/coastal fringe, or urban).
3.1.1. The gender division of labor. I use two separate measures of the gender division
of labor in zi. The first is the historic degree of female participation in agriculture. The
second is the suitability of the woman’s survey cluster for growing specific crops. I then
use these suitability measures as instruments for the historic importance of women in
agriculture. The exclusion restriction is that the relative productivity of different crops,
conditional on overall productivity, influences polygamy only through the gender divi-
sion of labor and is not correlated with unobserved determinants of polygamy. This is
similar to the restriction in Jacoby (1995).
3.1.2. Inequality. When I test for the importance of contemporary inequality, I use the
coefficient of variation of household wealth in zi.
7 I compute this within both survey
7I show in the Web Appendix that the results are similar if a Gini coefficient is used.
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clusters and sub-national regions. Because the wealth measures come normalized for
each country-round, these results are only interpretable when country-round fixed ef-
fects are included. I also use historic class stratification, a measure of historical inequal-
ity, in zi.
I also use geographic variables in zi that have been treated by other studies as predic-
tors of inequality. These are the log ratio of wheat to sugar suitability and heterogeneity
in land quality. The mechanism behind the log ratio of wheat to sugar suitability was
proposed by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997). Sugar production in the Americas was de-
pendent on slave labor, while wheat production was amenable to family farms. The
long-run result was more inequality in regions that grew sugar. Easterly (2007) finds
the log suitability ratio predicts inequality even outside the Americas, which suggests
that suitability for sugarcane predicts inequality-increasing agricultural practices even
where it is not grown. Heterogeneity in land quality is more intuitive; when there is in-
equality in the ability to produce income, outcomes should be unequal. Michalopoulos
et al. (2010) use this measure in explaining the rise of Islam. First-stage F statistics are
too weak to permit using these geographic variables as instruments for inequality. I can,
then, only offer a guarded interpretation; historical inequality or unobservable variables
that are correlated with ethnic institutions shape polygamy today.8
3.1.3. The slave trade. I use measures of ethnicity-level slave exports in zi, clustering
standard errors by ethnicity. I instrument for slave exports using distance of the survey
cluster from the closest slave port in the Americas. When country-round fixed effects are
included, this instrument loses predictive power. Thus, I follow Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011) and use distance from the coast as an alternative instrument. To demonstrate
that the results depend on a broad comparison of West Africa and the rest of the conti-
nent, I show that including longitude in xi eliminates the effect, as does re-estimating
this regression on the sub-sample of West African countries.9 Because my main data
source and that of Dalton and Leung (2011) both exclude Angola (the polygamy ques-
tion was not asked), I assemble alternative data using the DHS “household recodes.” I
code each household as polygamous if more than one woman is listed as a wife of the
household head. Individual controls are missing from these data, and so I only use geo-
graphic controls.
3.1.4. (Colonial) female education. First, I follow Huillery (2009) and include the aver-
age number of teachers per capita at the district (cercle) level in colonial French West
Africa over the period 1910-1928 in zi. I modify xi so that it matches the controls used
by Huillery (2009) as closely as possible. I always include the respondent’s year of birth,
8Other approaches to predicting inequality, such as unequal landholding (Dutt and Mitra, 2008), inequal-
ity in immigrants’ home countries (Putterman and Weil, 2010), or changes over time in relative prices of
“plantation” and “smallholder” crops (Galor et al., 2009) cannot be applied to these data.
9Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, and Togo.
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year squared, age, age squared, dummies for religion and the urban dummy. In suc-
cessive columns, I include measures of the attractiveness of the district to the French,
conditions of its conquest, pre-colonial conditions, and geographic variables in xi. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by 1925 district.
Second, I follow Nunn (2010) and include distance from a Catholic or Protestant mis-
sion in 1924 in zi.
10 Since much colonial education was conducted through missions,
this captures the combined effects of schooling and evangelism. Standard errors are
clustered by survey cluster. Because I do not have instruments for these historical vari-
ables, it is not possible to interpret these estimates as strictly causal. Indeed, geographic
controls do predict the location of colonial missions (not reported). Supporting a causal
interpretation, ethnicities recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas that practiced polygamy
received more missions per unit area, though this is not significant conditioning on geo-
graphic controls (not reported). The significant estimates I find are, however, consistent
with the importance of history in explaining polygamy.
3.2. Time-varying causes of polygamy. The data come as cross-sections of women
born in different years. This allows me to use variation in the ages at which women were
exposed to shocks such as drought, war, or economic growth to test for time-varying
causes of polygamy. For hypotheses of this type, my basic specification is:
(11) polygamousi = z
′
iβ + x
′
iγ + δj + ηt + i.
The variablespolygamousi, xi, and i are the same as above. zi now measures a woman’s
exposure to a shock around the time she is most marriageable. I measure shock at the
woman’s age of marriage and, because this is potentially endogenous, averaged over her
early adolescence (ages 12 to 16). δj is a fixed effect for the woman’s survey cluster. ηt
is a fixed effect for time – t is the year of marriage when zt is measured at the age of
marriage, and t is the year of birth when zt is measured over the ages 12 to 16. I am
comparing women across cohorts in the same survey cluster in order to identify β.
Because δj is collinear with geographic controls and the urban dummy, these con-
trols are dropped. ηt is collinear with year of birth and the combination of ηt and δj
are collinear with age when the shock is averaged over a woman’s adolescence. Thus, xi
only contains dummies for religion in that specification. I use OLS or IV to estimate (11).
Because the data are at the individual level, I am not able to include lagged polygamy.
Standard errors are clustered at the level at which zi varies.
3.2.1. Economic growth. I include log GDP per capita in zt. Standard errors are clustered
by country× year of marriage (or year of birth). I instrument for country-level GDP per
capita using the country-level rainfall estimates used by Miguel et al. (2004). Standard
errors are clustered by country-round in the IV estimation.
10Results are similar if dummy variables for whether a colonial mission exists within 5, 10, 15 or 20 km are
used in zi (not reported).
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3.2.2. Economic shocks. I include rainfall shocks in the woman’s survey cluster in zt.
Standard errors are clustered by cluster× year of marriage or cluster× year of birth.
3.2.3. War. I include the number of battle deaths in a conflict whose radius includes a
woman’s survey cluster in zt. I treat this as a proxy for conflict intensity. Standard errors
are clustered by cluster× year of marriage or year of birth.
3.2.4. Child mortality. I include (separately) country-level and sub-national measures
of under-5 mortality mortality in zt. Standard errors are clustered by country × year of
marriage or year of birth. It is possible that polygamy increases child mortality (Strass-
mann, 1997). Here, however, child mortality is measured at the time these women are
married and so precedes their fertility decisions. Causal interpretation requires that no
within-country time-variant unobservables are correlated with both child mortality and
polygamy. I also exploit a natural experiment in malaria eradication, described below.11
3.3. National policies: regression discontinuities. For each neighboring set of coun-
tries in the data, I select all clusters that are within 100 km of the border and estimate:
(12) polygamyi = β0 + β1Countryi + f(Distancei) + Countryi × f(Distancei) + x′iγ + i
I adopt the convention that Countryc is a dummy for the alphabetically prior country.
f(Distancei) is a cubic in distance from the border. Because of the small sample size and
inclusion of a spatial polynomial, I exclude the geographic controls from xi. I cluster
standard errors by survey cluster.
3.4. Female education and childmortality: natural experiments.
3.4.1. School-building inNigeria. From 1976 to 1981, the Nigerian government engaged
in a school-building program in certain states. Osili and Long (2008) use this to test
whether female schooling reduces fertility. I follow their approach, and use OLS to esti-
mate:
polygamyi = βBorn 1970-75 X Intensityi
+ αIntensityi + λBorn 1970-75+ x
′
iγ + i
Intensityi will, in different specifications, measure either whether the respondent’s
state was treated by the program, or spending per capita in the state. The controls in xi
match Osili and Long (2008). These are year of birth, dummies for the three largest Nige-
rian ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo), and dummies for the major religions (Muslim,
Catholic, Protestant, other Christian, and traditional). The sample includes only women
born between 1956-61 and 1970-75. This tests whether the school-building program
11I have explored using measures of health-care supply such as physicians per capita and government
health spending as instruments. I have not found any with predictive power once δj and ηi are included.
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had a differential effect on the women young enough to be exposed to it as children in
the affected states. β is the treatment effect. Standard errors are clustered by the states
that existed in 1976.
3.4.2. The end of white rule in Zimbabwe. The end of white rule in Zimbabwe increased
access to education for students who were 14 or younger in 1980. Agu¨ero and Ra-
machandran (2010) test for intergenerational effects of this education shock. Agu¨ero
and Bharadwaj (2011) examine the impacts on knowledge of HIV. Following these, I use
OLS to estimate:
polygamyi = βAge 14 or below in 1980i + αAge in 1980i
+ λ(14-Age in 1980) X (Age 14 or below in 1980)+ i
Like Agu¨ero and Ramachandran (2010), I do not include additional controls and I use
robust standard errors. The “full” sample includes women aged 6 to 22 in 1980, and the
“short” sample includes women aged 10 to 20 in that year. β measures the effect of the
change.
I show in the Web Appendix that a similar natural experiment from Sierra Leone (Mo-
can and Cannonier, 2012) did not reduce polygamy.
3.4.3. The eradication of malaria in Kigezi. In 1960, a joint program between the WHO
and the Government of Uganda eradicated malaria in the country’s Kigezi region. Fol-
lowing Barofsky et al. (2011), I estimate the effect of this program with the regression:
polygamyi = βPosti × Kigezii + x′iγ + δj + ηt + i
Here, Posti measures whether the respondent was born in 1960 or later, Kigezii is a
dummy for the treated region. δj is a district fixed effect, and ηt is a year-of-birth fixed
effect. xi includes dummies for religion, ethnicity and urban. Standard errors are clus-
tered by district. I use this to test for an impact of child mortality on polygamy. There
are two caveats. First, none of the women in the sample are old enough for treatment to
be measured relative to their year of marriage, rather than their year of birth. Second,
malaria eradication had several effects; Barofsky et al. (2011), for example, find educa-
tional impacts. My results can only provide indirect support for the importance of a
reduction in child mortality.
4. DATA
4.1. Dependent variables and controls. Data are taken from the “individual recode”
sections of 90 DHS surveys conducted in 34 sub-Saharan countries between 1986 and
2009. These individual-level samples are nationally representative cross-sections of
ever-married women of childbearing age. From these surveys, 494,157 observations
are available in which a woman’s polygamy status, year of birth, and urban residence
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are known. A woman is coded as polygamous if she reports that her husband has more
than one wife. Latitude and longitude coordinates of the respondent’s survey cluster are
known for 301,183 of these observations.12 Year of birth, year of birth squared, age, age
squared, dummies for religion, and urban are taken from these surveys.
Geographic controls are collected from several sources. For each of these, I assign
a survey cluster the value of the nearest raster point. I obtain suitability for rain-fed
agriculture and ecological zone from the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global
Agro-Ecological Zones (FAO-GAEZ) project. The ecological zones are dummy variables,
while the suitability measure ranges from 0 to 7. Elevation is an index that ranges from
0 to 255, taken from the North American Cartographic Information Society. Malaria en-
demism is from the Malaria Atlas Project, and ranges from 0 to 1. Ruggedness is the Ter-
rain Ruggedness Index used by Nunn and Puga (2012), which ranges from 0 to 1,368,318.
Absolute latitude and distance from the coast are computed directly from the cluster’s
coordinates. The women for whom geographic coordinates are available differ from the
full sample. They were generally born and married later, and are slightly more polyga-
mous (see the Web Appendix). This will only influence the estimation results if there are
heterogeneous treatment effects.
Other variables are specific to each hypothesis, and are described in greater detail
in the Web Appendix. Summary statistics are in Table 1. Because these variables come
from multiple sources, they are each available only for subsets of the data. Sample sizes,
then, differ across columns in the regression tables.
4.1.1. The gender division of labor. The suitability measures for specific crops are scores
between 0 and 7, published by the FAO. These vary by survey cluster. These are available
for wheat, maize, cereals, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar, oil crops, and cotton. Though
chosen for their availability, these crops are important in the countries in the data. For
example, they accounted for 83% of the value of crop production in Zambia and 91% in
Namibia in 2000 (faostat.fao.org).
Historic female participation in agriculture is taken from the Murdock (1967) Ethno-
graphic Atlas. This source reports the ethnic institutions of 1,267 global societies, roughly
at the time of European contact. I join these to the DHS data using respondents’ eth-
nic groups. More than 40% of the sample could be assigned a level of “historic female
agriculture” by this method. The polygyny rate for this sample is roughly 10 percentage
points greater than for the unmatched sample. This sample differs along other observ-
able dimensions, though these differences are small (see the Web Appendix). “Historic
female agriculture” assigns each ethnic group a score between 1 and 5 indicating the
degree to which women were important relative to men in agriculture.
12Recent DHS surveys add noise to these coordinates. Because this displaces 99% of clusters less than
5 km and keeps them within national boundaries, this adds only measurement error to the geographic
controls.
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4.1.2. Inequality. I use the wealth index from the DHS to measure inequality. This is
a factor score computed separately for every survey round, based on household own-
ership of durable goods. I compute coefficients of variation and Gini coefficients from
these data, measuring inequality across households within the survey cluster or sub-
national region.
I take “historic class stratification” from the Ethnographic Atlas. This is a score be-
tween 1 and 5 describing the extent of class differences before colonial rule. The sample
for which this is non-missing is similar to the sample for which “historic female agricul-
ture” is available.
The log ratio of wheat to sugar suitability is computed directly from the FAO data.
Heterogeneity in land quality is the coefficient of variation of constraints on rain-fed
agriculture for the survey clusters within each region. The constraints variable is an
index between 1 and 7. It measures the combination of soil, climate, and terrain slope
constraints. It also comes from the FAO.
4.1.3. The slave trade. I match women in the sample to slave trade estimates from Nunn
and Wantchekon (2011) using self-declared ethnicity. The estimates are reported on a
map, allowing me to use respondents’ geographic coordinates to create an alternative
spatial measure of slave trade intensity. Since it is easier to measure slave exports across
ports than across ethnicities, this will reduce measurement error. Further, the long-run
effects of the slave trade may have worked through institutions that vary by location,
rather than by ethnicity. Following Dalton and Leung (2011), I use the log of (one plus)
Atlantic slave trade exports normalized by area to measure slave trade exposure.
4.1.4. Female education. Years of schooling are reported in the DHS data. I use three
measures of Nigeria’s school building program from Osili and Long (2008): a dummy for
a “high intensity” state, school-building funds in 1976 divided by the 1953 census popu-
lation estimates, and school-building funds normalized by (unreliable) 1976 population
projections. I match survey clusters to the old states using their coordinates. Since the
1999 Nigerian DHS do not report coordinates, I do not use this wave.
Teachers per capita and other controls from colonial French West Africa from Huillery
(2009) are available on her website. Locations of colonial missions from Nunn (2010)
(originally from Roome (1924)) are available on his website.
4.1.5. Economic growth. GDP per capita is from the World Development Indicators.
Rainfall measures from the Miguel et al. (2004) data set are average precipitation over
geographic points in a country during a given year, measured by the Global Precipita-
tion Climatology Project.
4.1.6. Economic shocks. Rainfall shocks taken from a University of Delaware series that
reports annual rainfall on a latitude/longitude grid. Each cluster is joined to the nearest
grid point. I measure shocks as the ratio of rainfall in year t to average rainfall for that
cluster.
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4.1.7. War. I take battle deaths from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset. Each con-
flict has a latitude/longitude coordinate, a radius, and a best estimate of the number of
battle deaths during each year of fighting. If a war’s radius overlaps a woman’s survey
cluster in her marriageable years, she is “treated” by these battle deaths.
4.1.8. National policies. Distance to each national border is computed by calculating
the minimum distance between a survey cluster and a pixelated border map.
4.1.9. Child mortaltiy. Child mortality (under 5) is taken from the World Development
Indicators. Because it is only reported every five years, it is interpolated linearly by
country. In the Web Appendix, I show that alternative measures taken from the Insti-
tute for Health Metrics and Evaluation or computed directly from DHS birth histories
give similar results.
For Uganda, “Kigezi” is a dummy for whether the respondent’s survey cluster is in Ka-
bale, Kanungu, Kisoro or Rukungiri. In addition to the DHS sample, I use the 1991 Ugan-
dan census, available through IPUMS. Because polygamy is only reported for household
heads in the census, I limit my sample to wives of household heads when using these
data.
4.2. Polygamy across space and time. I map polygamy in Figure 1. Each point is a
married woman for whom coordinates are available. Red dots indicate polygamists;
blue dots are monogamists. Polygamy is concentrated in West Africa, though a high-
intensity belt stretches through to Tanzania. Polygamy in the data is largely bigamy:
72% of respondents report that they are the only wife, 19% report that their husband
has two wives, 7% report that he has three wives, and fewer than 2% report that he has
4 wives or more.
I show the decline of polygamy over time in Figure 2. A raw correlation between year
of birth and polygamy will confound time trends with age effects, since a young lone
wife may later become a polygamist’s senior wife. Thus, I estimate the time trend of
polygamy for each country with more than one cross-section. I use the regression:
polygamousi = f(agei) + g(year of birthi) + i.
The functions f and g are quartic. I use the estimated coefficients and survey weights
to calculate the predicted probability that a woman aged 30 is polygamous as a function
of her year of birth. I present these in Figure 2. Though the speed of the decline has
differed across countries, its presence has been almost universal. To my knowledge,
this is not a trend that has been documented previously.13
13Because the data do not contain a representative sample of men, I am not able to conduct a similar
exercise for men.
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FIGURE 1. Polygamy in Africa
This figure plots polygamy for the women in the sample that have latitude and longitude coordinates. A
red dot indicates polygamy, and a blue dot indicates monogamy.
5. RESULTS
5.1. The gender division of labor. I show in Table 2 that the distribution of polygamy
within Africa is inconsistent with Jacoby’s (1995) results. The variables that predict fe-
male productivity in his sample do not predict polygamy here. Roots and tubers (the
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FIGURE 2. Predicted polygamy over time for women aged 30, by year of birth
equivalent of yams and sweet potatoes) have a negative impact on polygamy. His nega-
tive coefficient on maize is not found here.14
Polygamy and the historical importance of women in agriculture are negatively cor-
related. Polygamy is concentrated in the Sahel and Sudan regions where women have
14With no controls, wheat, roots and tubers, and oil crops positively predict female importance in agri-
culture, while cereals have a negative effect. With controls, roots and tubers become insignificant and
cotton becomes positive. Adding country-round fixed effects makes all correlations insignificant, except
oil crops (positive) and sugar (negative).
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been less important in agriculture than in more tropical parts of Africa. Additional con-
trols (in particular, religion), lead this result to become insignificant across countries,
though it remains significant within countries. The correlations are moderate; a one
standard deviation increase in historic female agriculture reduces polygamy by roughly
3 percentage points in the most conservative specification. If I include population den-
sity and its interaction with historic female agriculture, the interaction is not significant
(not reported).
The IV results are larger than the OLS estimates. More severe measurement error in
the historic division of labor than in contemporary geographic conditions is one ex-
planation. It is also possible that crop suitability cannot be excluded from the second
stage. Indeed, conventional over-identification tests fail on these data. Still, the hy-
pothesis that the gender division of labor in agriculture determines polygamy cannot
explain why polygamy is most prevalent in those parts of Africa where female labor in
agriculture has historically been least important.15
Why do my results differ from those of Jacoby (1995)? I show in the Web Appendix that
my results hold even within the Ivory Coast. The hypothesis that a greater importance
of women in agriculture leads to polygamy ignores general equilibrium effects captured
by the model in section 2.
5.2. Inequality. In Table 3, I show that there is no large positive relationship between
present-day wealth inequality and polygamy. In the one specification where the corre-
lation is statistically significant, the point estimate is very small. Historic class stratifi-
cation, by contrast, predicts polygamy today. The geographic predictors of inequality
also predict polygamy, further suggesting that the long-term determinants of inequality
matter. The wheat-sugar ratio is significant across specifications. Greater intra-regional
differences in land quality predict higher levels of polygamy, though this is not robust to
the inclusion of other controls unless country-round fixed-effects are also included.
The magnitudes of the effects vary. A one standard deviation reduction in historical
class stratification would raise polygamy by a bit more than 2 percentage points. This is
not negligible, but is not large enough to explain a substantial fraction of the variance
in polygamy. A one standard deviation movement in the log wheat-sugar ratio is asso-
ciated with a roughly 3 percentage point reduction in polygamy rates, while the com-
parable effect for unequal land quality is a bit larger than 2 percentage points without
controls.
The data do not make it possible to identify the mechanisms that allow past inequal-
ity to better explain polygamy today than present-day inequality. I do not, for example,
have data on hypergamy. There are at least two likely explanations. First, the basis of
inequality in African societies has changed. Whereas inequality in the past was based
15The first-stage F-statistics are low because I treat all suitability measures as instruments. If I select only
those with the most predictive power, the first-stage F-statistics improve without qualitatively changing
the results.
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largely on “wealth in people” (Guyer, 1993), inequality today depends more on factors
such as human capital that are not complemented by polygamy. Supporting this in-
terpretation, Lagerlo¨f (2010) argues that greater inequality leads to polygamy only in
earlier stages of development. Second, institutions are slow to evolve. Other results be-
low confirm the importance of historical variables and the low elasticities of polygamy
with respect to present-day shocks.
5.3. The slave trade. In Table 4, I find a positive correlation between the slave trade and
current-day polygamy. This is true in both individual-level and household-level data. It
is more robust when respondents are matched to treatment by location rather than by
ethnic group. In the individual-level OLS, a one standard deviation increase in slave
exports predicts a 2 percentage point increase in polygamy. The IV results are more
than 10 times as large. This is consistent with more severe measurement error in slave
exports than in geographic location.
This effect depends, however, on the comparison of West Africa with the rest of the
continent. I use Table 4 to show that country fixed effects, controlling for longitude, and
separately estimating the effects using only the West African sub-sample do not yield
significant positive results. The hypothesis that the slave trade increased polygamy in
Africa is supported, but the fineness of the variation that can be used to identify the
effect should not be overstated.
5.4. Female education. I show in Table 5 that the educational expansions in Nigeria
and Zimbabwe do not predict discontinuous drops in polygamy. In the Web Appen-
dix, I show that these results are consistent with the small (though statistically robust)
correlation between years of education and polygamy in observational data. I do find
a negative effect of schooling in colonial French West Africa on polygamy today in Ta-
ble 6. A one standard deviation increase in colonial education reduces polygamy by
roughly 1 percentage point.16 While I find that proximity to a historical Catholic mis-
sion reduces polygamy today, the similar effect of distance from a protestant mission
disappears once country-round or region-round fixed effects are added. A one standard
deviation increase in access to a Catholic mission reduces polygamy by roughly 3 per-
centage points with the tightest fixed effects. I find no evidence that Catholic missions
better predict polygamy in colonies of Catholic countries, or where Protestant missions
are more distant (not reported).
The lack of an impact for modern education is similar to the finding in Friedman et al.
(2011) that educating women does not create “modern” attitudes. The historical results
are consistent with the findings in Nunn (2010) that Catholic missions imparted both
education and ideologies about the role of women. These results suggest that education
16There is a negative correlation between polygamy today and health workers in the past, but this is not
robust to additional controls.
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only reduces polygamy rates over the long term and in conjunction with other interven-
tions. While colonial schooling was largely performed by missionaries, for whom the
sanctity of Christian marriage was an overarching concern (e.g. Chanock (1985)), this
is not true of modern education. One confounding effect is that all of the interventions
here affected both women and men. Whether a transfer of human capital to men will
increase or reduce polygamy will depend on whether there is assortive matching and
on the relative value men give to the quality versus the quantity of their children (Gould
et al., 2008; Siow, 2006).
Another possibility is that historical education proxies for parental education, which
is not available in the DHS data. I show in the Web Appendix, however, that mother’s
education does not predict polygamy in World Bank surveys from Nigeria, Ghana, and
the Ivory Coast. Daughters of more educated fathers are less likely to be polygamous in
Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, and the negative correlations between own education and
polygamy are significant only in the Ivory Coast.
5.5. Economic growth. I show in Table 7 that higher levels of GDP per capita during a
woman’s marriageable years predict that she is less likely to marry a polygamist. The
estimated coefficients are, however, small. A 100% increase in GDP per capita would re-
duce polygamy by roughly 2 percentage points in the unconditional OLS specifications.
This rises to roughly 20 points in the IV. While economic growth has been cyclical and
halting, most countries in the sample have seen a steady decline in polygamy, even if
this has been faster when growth has accelerated.
5.6. Economic shocks. In Table 7, a positive rainfall shock in a woman’s marriageable
years predicts that she is less likely to marry polygamously. These effects are small. Rais-
ing rainfall by 100% over its normal value would only have a roughly 3 percentage point
effect on polygamy.17
5.7. War. In Table 7, war increases polygamy. This is marginally insignificant when
measured at the year of marriage, though it is robust when averaged over early adoles-
cence, and becomes larger and more significant if rainfall shocks are also included (see
the Web Appendix). Although I take war as a random shock, I am unable to rule out the
possibility that war operates through intermediate channels or that unobserved shocks
cause both war and polygamy. The effects are again small. A war that kills one million
people would, depending on the specification, raise a woman’s probability of marrying
polygamously by between 25 and 100 percentage points. On average, a woman receives
a much smaller shock closer to 7,000 battle deaths in her year of marriage in the event
she is affected by a war.
17Because rainfall may be mean-reverting, I also allow rainfall to enter separately for each year between
ages 12 and 16 (not reported). The coefficients are negative, but significant only at age 16. Interacting
these shocks with the gender division of labor shows their effect to be largest where women are most
important in agriculture (not reported).
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5.8. National borders. I report regression discontinuities in Table 8. Most borders do
not bring significant discontinuous changes in polygamy rates. Of the seven excep-
tions, two can be immediately discarded; too few clusters were surveyed near the Benin-
Burkina Faso and CAR-DRC borders for the polynomial to be estimated accurately. Sim-
ilarly, the Cameroon-Nigeria and Niger-Nigeria discontinuities are driven by outliers
near the border, and disappear with either a linear or quadratic distance polynomial.
The remaining three breaks are large. There is no obvious mechanism that explains
the discontinuities at CAR-Cameroon, Ivory Coast-Liberia, and Malawi-Tanzania bor-
ders. While Bubb (2009) finds discontinuities indicating higher levels of education and
numeracy in Ghana than in the Ivory Coast, education cannot explain the outcomes. I
add years of schooling as a control; this has only a modest effect on the magnitudes (not
reported).
5.9. Childmortality. The difference-in-difference estimates in Table 7 suggest that the
effect of child mortality on polygamy is sizable. These results suggest an elasticity of at
least 0.7. The magnitudes are similar if I use alternative estimates from the Institute for
Health Metrics and Evaluation, and are roughly 40% as large if I use sub-national region-
specific estimates computed from the raw DHS data (see the Web Appendix). Using
these DHS-based estimates, the magnitudes are similar using the mortality of boys or
girls (not reported). In a country such as Nigeria, where under-5 mortality has fallen
from more than 28% in the early 1960s to roughly 14% today, this is enough to explain a
roughly 4 to 10 percentage point drop in polygamy rates over the period. I show in the
Web Appendix that this is robust to including GDP per capita as a control.
The results for Uganda provide suggestive evidence of causation. The DHS data show
that women born after the malaria eradication program in the treatment area were
roughly 7 percentage points less likely to marry polygamously. The IPUMS data give a
smaller effect, equal to less than 1 percentage point, reflecting the lower polygamy rate
for wives of household heads in the IPUMS data (11%) than all ever-married women in
the DHS (31%).
Several other facts support the interpretation that polygamy is a strategy for men to
increase their fertility, which would explain this result. Marriage of older women is rare;
95% of polygamists began their most recent marriage no later than age 27.18 Interacting
child mortality with the wealth index suggests the effect is largest for wealthier house-
holds (not reported). In the Web Appendix, I show that first wives whose first child dies
are more likely to become polygamists, though I do not find an effect of child gender or
twinning. Similarly, Milazzo (2012) has found that desired fertility leads Nigerian men
to seek additional wives if their first wives do not have children; see also Wagner and
Rieger (2011).
18The duration of the respondent’s current marriage is reported in bins such as “15-19 years.” The maxi-
mum age at most recent marriage is age minus the minimum value in this bin.
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6. CONCLUSION
I have tested three influential theories of polygamy, and none have passed cleanly.
Polygamy rates in the present are more related to inequality and female education in
the past than they are to these variables today. The relative distribution of polygamy in
Africa cannot be explained by the traditional gender division of labor. The slave trade
remains a plausible explanation. However, this is indistinguishable from the fact that
polygamy rates are higher in West Africa.
The widespread decline in African polygamy since independence has continued un-
hindered by the fits and starts of economic growth. Still, it has fallen furthest where
growth has been strongest. Economic shocks and violence in a woman’s prime years of
marriage increase polygamy, but the magnitudes of these effects are small. The decline
has passed smoothly over national laws and most national borders. The education of
women in Africa has also advanced in recent decades. I do not find any evidence, how-
ever, that post-independence schooling expansions have reduced polygamy. By con-
trast, schooling in the past appears to have had a noticeable effect. Polygamy has fallen
within both rural and urban areas, for women who self-declare as “Muslim” or as “Tra-
ditional”, and among those who cannot read. Declining child mortality appears to have
played a substantial role, but still leaves the majority of the decline unexplained. Exist-
ing theories cannot explain the bulk of the decline of African polygamy, nor can most of
the causal links uncovered here.
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APPENDIX A. ROBUSTNESS AND ADDITIONAL HYPOTHESES
The following robustness checks are detailed in the Web Appendix.
A.1. Additional summary statistics and observable characteristics by sub-sample.
(1) Observable characteristics of the sample of polygamists differ from those of the
sample of non- polygamists.
(2) Observable characteristics of the sample for which the historic importance of
women in agriculture is missing differ from those of the sample for which it is
28 JAMES FENSKE
non-missing. I show similar comparisons for the sub-samples with non-missing
historic class stratification and geographic coordinates.
(3) I provide summary statistics on the distribution of respondents’ husbands’ total
number of wives, and respondents’ ranks as wives.
A.2. The gender division of labor.
(1) Results are similar when the sample is restricted to societies that earn at least
half their subsistence from agriculture.
(2) Results are similar when dummies for ecological type are excluded.
(3) Results are similar when estimated only on the Ivory Coast.
A.3. Inequality.
(1) The correlation between country-level inequality in a woman’s prime marriage-
able years and polygamy is small or nonexistent.
(2) Results using cluster and region wealth Gini coefficients are similar to the base-
line results.
(3) A binary indicator of historical class stratification gives similar results to the base-
line.
A.4. Female education.
(1) There is only a small (though robust) correlation between years of schooling and
polygamy.
A.5. Economic growth.
(1) Results are robust to including terms of trade as a control.
(2) Results are similar when estimated on the sample of non-migrants.
A.6. Economic shocks.
(1) Results are similar when estimated on the sample of non-migrants.
A.7. War.
(1) Results are stronger when rainfall shocks are included.
(2) Results are similar when estimated on the sample of non-migrants.
A.8. Childmortality.
(1) Results are similar when using an alternative measure of child mortality from the
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation.
(2) Results are similar when using an alternative measure of child mortality for sub-
national regions computed using the birth histories section of the DHS.
(3) Results are similar when estimated on the sample of non-migrants.
(4) Results are robust to including log GDP per capita as a control.
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A.9. Other hypotheses not discussed in the text. Though I have tried to be compre-
hensive, testing the most influential theories in the literature about the determinants
of polygamy, I am constrained by space and data availability to ignore some plausible
explanations of polygamy and its decline. I include religion as a control, but do not at-
tempt to explain whether it has a causal impact. It is impossible to construct a synthesis
in which I test all nine hypotheses simultaneously. Many variables are only available for
non-overlapping sub-samples of the data. Further, the econometric specifications that
I use to test the separate hypotheses cannot be combined into one equation. This pre-
vents me from decomposing polygamy into separate components explained by trends,
shocks, and geography.
I have tested whether additional time-invariant variables predict polygamy using (10).
Polygamy and bride price recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas both predict polygamy. A
quadratic function of historic population density gives an inverse-U pattern. This is
consistent with many hypotheses. Baker et al. (2008), for example, argue that inequality
is highest at intermediate population densities. The ratio of people to land may also
reflect the cost of allocating farms across wives.
I have tested whether additional time-varying variables predict polygamy using (11)
I have found no impact of urbanization or life expectancy. There is no significant cor-
relation between the rate of population growth in a woman’s year of marriage and the
probability she is polygamous. There is a negative correlation if population growth is
measured over her adolescence. This is surprising, as in standard models (e.g. Tertilt
(2005)) population growth facilitates polygamy. Similarly, higher country-level fertility
rates in a woman’s year of marriage or averaged over her adolescence predict lower rates
of polygamy. This is interpretable if wives and births per wife are substitutes in produc-
ing births.
Mean s.d. Min. Max. N Mean s.d. Min. Max. N
Main controls The gender division of labor
HH Polygynous 0.28 0.45 0 1 494,157 Historic female agriculture 2.91 0.89 1 5 207,757
Resp. Age 30.8 8.70 10 64 494,157 Inequality
Urban 0.30 0.46 0 1 494,157 Cluster c.v. of wealth index 2.95 39.2 0 3,721 241,709
Year of birth 1,970 10.5 1,937 1,994 494,157 Region c.v. of wealth index 15.1 148 0.22 3,199 240,656
Religion: Animist 0.0071 0.084 0 1 494,157 Historic class stratification 3.20 1.39 1 5 219,474
Religion: Catholic 0.17 0.37 0 1 494,157 Log wheat sugar ratio -1.04 0.68 -2.08 1.61 297,936
Religion: Christian (Other) 0.025 0.16 0 1 494,157 Region c.v. of ag. constraints. 0.18 0.064 0 0.39 301,183
Religion: Missing 0.093 0.29 0 1 494,157 The slave trade
Religion: None 0.044 0.21 0 1 494,157 ln(1+Atlantic slaves/Area), by name 0.62 0.99 0 3.66 259,012
Religion: Orthodox 0.016 0.12 0 1 494,157 Dist. Atlantic ST by name 5,818 1,531 3,694 9,258 259,012
Religion: Other 0.096 0.29 0 1 494,157 ln(1+Atlantic slaves/Area), by location 0.45 0.84 0 3.77 301,183
Religion: Protestant 0.19 0.39 0 1 494,157 Dist. Atlantic ST by location 6,143 1,719 3,702 9,534 301,183
Religion: Spiritual 0.0036 0.060 0 1 494,157 Female education
Religion: Traditional 0.025 0.16 0 1 494,157 Resp. Education Years 3.27 4.06 0 26 493,829
Religion: Muslim (excluded) 0.34 0.47 0 1 494,157 High intensity 0.85 0.36 0 1 35,513
Ecological zones Funds/capita (1953 pop.) 92.3 53.0 1.40 220 35,513
Woodland 0.22 0.42 0 1 301,183 Funds/capita (1976 pop.) 1.77 1.32 0.15 6.19 35,513
Forest 0.059 0.24 0 1 301,183 Teachers/cap (1925) 0.00046 0.0022 4.3e-06 0.024 103,432
Mosaics 0.15 0.36 0 1 301,183 Distance to Catholic Mission (000 km) 0.21 0.20 0.00015 1.17 301,183
Cropland 0.12 0.33 0 1 301,183 Distance to Protestant Mission (000 km) 0.17 0.19 0.00010 1.22 301,183
Intensive cropland 0.0011 0.033 0 1 301,183 Economic growth
Wetland 0.0088 0.094 0 1 301,183 Ln GDP per capita: Age of marriage 5.73 0.70 -3.85 9.06 448,195
Desert/Bare 0.034 0.18 0 1 301,183 Ln GDP per capita: Ages 12-16 5.72 0.71 -3.84 8.79 422,763
Water/Coastal fringe 0.041 0.20 0 1 301,183 GPCP Rain: Age of marriage 1,000 437 122 2,588 335,661
Urban 0.0061 0.078 0 1 301,183 CPCP Rain: Ages 12-16 1,014 429 181 2,376 275,863
Other GIS controls Economic shocks
Malaria 0.38 0.19 0 0.75 301,183 Rainfall shock: Age of marriage 0.95 0.19 0 8.06 252,079
Elevation 165 10.3 140 195 301,183 Rainfall shock: Ages 12-16 0.95 0.11 0 2.97 268,381
Ruggedness 64,300 102,512 0 1.37e+06 301,183 War
Distance to coast 463 358 0.013 1,771 301,183 Battle deaths: Age of marriage (millions) 0.0011 0.0050 0 0.12 300,669
Abs. latitude 10.7 5.18 0.0015 28.7 301,183 Battle deaths Ages 12-16 (millions) 0.0012 0.0037 0 0.033 300,390
Crop suitability Battle deaths: Age of marriage (nonzero) 0.0072 0.011 0.000020 0.12 47,572
Wheat suit. 0.42 1.05 0 7 298,017 Battle deaths Ages 12-16 (nonzero) 0.0044 0.0063 4.0e-06 0.033 78,118
Maize suit. 2.02 1.74 0 7 301,183 Child mortality
Cereals suit. 3.26 1.73 0 7 299,058 Child mortality: Ages of marriage 0.19 0.059 0.054 0.42 474,759
Roots and tubers suit. 2.04 1.68 0 7 301,183 Child mortality: Ages 12-16 0.20 0.058 0.057 0.40 456,573
Pulses suit. 2.43 1.61 0 7 299,058
Sugar suit. 2.88 1.60 0 7 299,058
Oil suit. 0.83 1.14 0 7 299,058
Cotton suit. 1.64 1.70 0 7 299,074
Rainfed ag. suit. 4.08 2.06 0 7 299,108
Table 1. Summary statistics
Historic female agriculture -0.065*** -0.031*** -0.091*** -0.035*** -0.145*** -0.201**
(0.021) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.031) (0.086)
Wheat suit. -0.070*** -0.003** -0.064*** -0.005
(0.002) (0.001) (0.014) (0.004)
Maize suit. 0.004* 0.007*** 0.019** 0.007**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003)
Cereals suit. 0.021*** -0.004** -0.006 -0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003)
Roots and tubers suit. -0.003* -0.005*** -0.013* -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003)
Pulses suit. -0.008*** 0.002 -0.002 0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.005)
Sugar suit. 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.015* 0.009*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004)
Oil suit. -0.030*** 0.001 0.008 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.005)
Cotton suit. 0.004* 0.000 0.006 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Observations 297,936 297,936 139,499 139,499 207,757 140,023 139,499 139,499
Other controls None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind.
F.E. None Cntry-rnd None Cntry-rnd None Cntry-rnd None Cntry-rnd
Clustering Cluster Cluster E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic.
F test 10.66 1.812
Excluded instrument(s) Crop. Suit. Crop. Suit.
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls (Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed
agriculture, malaria endemism, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of
birth squared, religious dummies, age, age squared, and urban.
Table 2. The gender division of labor
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Cluster wealth c.v. 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Region wealth c.v. -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Historic class stratification 0.031*** 0.019*** 0.012**
(0.012) (0.007) (0.005)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 241,709 168,363 240,656 168,378 219,474 148,768 148,768
Other controls None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind.
F.E. Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd None None Cntry-rnd
Clustering Cluster Cluster Region Region E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic.
Log wheat sugar ratio -0.116*** -0.046*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Region c.v. of ag. constraints. 0.370*** 0.004 0.205***
(0.107) (0.067) (0.064)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 0.030 0.129 0.155 301,183 299,108 299,108
Other controls None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd None None Cntry-rnd
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Region Region Region
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Table 3. Inequality
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls (Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed agriculture, malaria
endemism, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of birth squared, religious dummies, age, age
squared, and urban.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
ln(1+Atl. slaves/Area), by location 0.043*** 0.024** -0.008 0.008 -0.005 0.028** 0.019* -0.010*
(0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.005)
ln(1+Atl. slaves/Area), by name 0.025* 0.006 -0.001
(0.013) (0.011) (0.007)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 301,183 299,108 299,108 299,108 170,674 259,012 169,241 169,241 291,060 288,882 288,882
Sample Full Full Full Full W. Africa Full Full Full Full Full Full
Other controls None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Longitude None None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. None Geo. Geo.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd None None None None Cntry-rnd None None Cntry-rnd
Clustering
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
ln(1+Atl. slaves/Area), by location 0.429*** 0.363*** -0.068*** -0.107** -0.075* 0.310*** 0.420*** -0.042**
(0.108) (0.104) (0.024) (0.044) (0.044) (0.076) (0.138) (0.018)
ln(1+Atl. slaves/Area), by name 0.300*** 0.381* -0.034
(0.084) (0.199) (0.029)
Estimator IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Observations 301,183 299,108 299,108 301,183 170,674 259,012 169,241 169,241 291,060 288,882 288,882
Sample Full Full Full Full W. Africa Full Full Full Full Full Full
Other controls None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Longitude None None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. None Geo. Geo.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd None None None None Cntry-rnd None None Cntry-rnd
Clustering
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
F test 17.87 15.91 18.00 13.50 9.891 15.35 5.411 13.93 18.90 11.26 17.84
Excluded instrument(s) ST distance ST distance Coast dist. ST distance ST distance ST distance ST distance Coast dist. ST distance ST distance Coast dist.
Table 4. The slave trade
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls (Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed agriculture, malaria endemism, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and
ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of birth squared, religious dummies, age, age squared, and urban.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Individual recode Household recode
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Individual recode Household recode
Born 1970-75 X Intensity 0.048* 0.000 -0.012 14 or below in 1980 -0.008 -0.001
(0.025) (0.000) (0.008) (0.020) (0.025)
Born 1970-75 -0.108*** -0.095** -0.043 Age in 1980 0.002 0.003
(0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.003) (0.005)
Intensity -0.004 0.000 -0.019*** (14-Age in 1980) -0.002 -0.004
(0.054) (0.000) (0.006)      X Below 14 in 1980 (0.004) (0.008)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS Estimator OLS OLS
Sample Sample Zimb. "Full" Zimb. "Short"
Measure of intensity
High / low
Dollars / 1953 
pop.
Dollars / 1976 
pop. Ages in 1980 6 to 22 10 to 20
Observations 9,668 9,668 9,668 Observations 6,367 3,901
Other controls Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Other controls No No
F.E. None None None F.E. None None
Clustering 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State Clustering Robust Robust
Dep. Var.: PolygamousDep. Var.: Polygamous
Nigerians b. 1970-75 and 1956-61.
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Osili/Long controls are year of birth, and dummies for the three largest Nigerian
ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo), and the major religions (Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other Christian, and traditional). 
Table 5. Modern education
Teachers/capita, 1910-1928 -7.227*** -5.175*** -9.197*** -9.195*** -4.166**
(1.314) (1.834) (2.245) (3.255) (1.974)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample
Observations 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432
F.E. None None None None None
Other controls None Attractiveness Conquest Precolonial H-Geographic
Clustering District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925
Distance to Catholic mission 0.191*** 0.064*** 0.051*** 0.155***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.026)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 301,183 299,039 299,039 299,039
Other controls None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Ind.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd Region
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Distance to Protestant mission 0.233*** -0.003 -0.087*** 0.014
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.025)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 301,183 299,039 299,039 299,039
Other controls None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Ind.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd Region
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls (Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed
agriculture, malaria endemism, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of birth
squared, religious dummies, age, age squared, and urban. Attractiveness controls are trade taxes in 1914. Conquest controls are date of conquest,
length of resistence and its square, and indemnities in 1910. Precolonial controls are the presence of an ancient state, the presence of a European
trade counter, and 1925 population density. H-Geographic controls are latitude, longitude, altitude, dummies for the river and coast, and average
rainfall from 1915 to 1975.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Table 6. Colonial education
French West Africa
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Shock Rainfall Battle deaths Child mort. (WDI)
Shock at age of marriage -0.015*** -0.201*** -0.025*** 0.238 0.736***
(0.004) (0.074) (0.004) (0.153) (0.074)
Estimator OLS IV OLS OLS OLS
Observations 448,195 318,119 252,079 300,669 474,759
Other controls Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual
FE Y.O.M./Cluster Y.O.M./Cluster Y.O.M./Cluster Y.O.M./Cluster Y.O.M./Cluster
Clustering Country x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M. Cluster x Y.O.M. Cluster x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M.
F test 8.855
Excluded instrument(s) GPCP Rainfall
Shock Rainfall Battle deaths Child mort. (WDI)
Shock over ages 12-16 -0.014*** -0.257** -0.040*** 1.088*** 0.987***
(0.005) (0.119) (0.008) (0.220) (0.083)
Estimator OLS IV OLS OLS OLS
Observations 422,763 253,662 268,381 300,390 456,573
Other controls Religion Religion Religion Religion Religion
FE Y.O.B./Cluster Y.O.B./Cluster Y.O.B./Cluster Y.O.B./Cluster Y.O.B./Cluster
Clustering Country x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M. Cluster x Y.O.M. Cluster x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M.
F test 6.265
Excluded instrument(s) GPCP Rainfall
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls (Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed agriculture,
malaria endemism, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of birth squared,
religious dummies, age, age squared, and urban.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Table 7. Time-varying determinants of polygamy
Ln(GDP per capita)
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Ln(GDP per capita)
Benin and 
Burkina Faso
Benin and 
Niger
Benin and 
Nigeria
Benin and 
Togo
Burkina Faso 
and Ghana
Burkina Faso 
and Ivory 
Coast
Burkina Faso 
and Niger
Burkina Faso 
and Mali
Burkina Faso 
and Togo
CAR and 
Cameroon CAR and DRC
Cameroon and 
Nigeria
DRC and 
Rwanda
Border 0.867* 0.092 0.051 0.029 0.067 0.089 0.082 -0.023 0.048 0.189* -0.726* -0.201** 0.000
(0.444) (0.086) (0.148) (0.053) (0.075) (0.143) (0.115) (0.076) (0.116) (0.095) (0.396) (0.095) (0.000)
Obs 1,605 1,375 9,217 14,855 5,503 1,803 3,857 11,148 2,603 1,255 1,924 7,198 5,359
DRC and 
Tanzania
DRC and 
Uganda
DRC and 
Zambia
Ethiopia and 
Kenya
Ghana and 
Ivory Coast
Ghana and 
Togo
Guinea and 
Ivory Coast
Guinea and 
Liberia
Guinea and 
Mali
Guinea and 
Senegal
Ivory Coast 
and Liberia
Ivory Coast 
and Mali
Kenya and 
Tanzania
Border -4.381 -0.134 -0.033 0.135 -0.049 -0.009 0.095 -0.006 0.144 -0.169 -0.130** 0.243 0.106
(8.703) (0.174) (0.043) (0.138) (0.077) (0.041) (0.408) (0.070) (0.118) (0.186) (0.059) (0.150) (0.142)
Obs 887 3,210 1,665 470 3,957 11,518 2,145 4,458 4,628 2,126 4,000 3,380 4,639
Kenya and 
Uganda
Malawi and 
Mozambique
Malawi and 
Tanzania
Malawi and 
Zambia Mali and Niger
Mali and 
Senegal
Mozambique 
and Tanzania
Mozambique 
and Zambia
Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe
Niger and 
Nigeria
Rwanda and 
Tanzania
Rwanda and 
Uganda
Zambia and 
Zimbabwe
Border -0.099 0.040 0.158*** -0.000 0.301 0.093 -4.497 0.000 -0.106 -0.125** 0.026 -0.043 0.049
(0.085) (0.061) (0.060) (0.064) (0.213) (0.096) (2.932) (0.000) (0.210) (0.061) (0.066) (0.043) (0.110)
Obs 3,793 16,673 2,919 7,019 887 2,208 1,592 574 2,885 12,252 4,064 5,284 1,629
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS, with polygyny as the dependent variable and standard errors clustered at the survey cluster level. Other controls are a cubic in distance to the
border, interacted with a country dummy, year of birth, year of birth squared, religious dummies, age, age squared, and urban. The coefficient reflects the jump from moving to the alphabetically prior country. 
Table 8. National borders
DHS IPUMS
Kigezi X Post (birth) -0.074** -0.007**
(0.035) (0.003)
Estimator OLS OLS
Observations 8,740 182,553
Other controls Rel/Urb/Eth Rel/Urb/Eth
F.E. Y.O.B./Dist. Y.O.B./Dist.
Clustering District District
Table 9. Malaria eradication in Uganda
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Sample
only includes Uganda. Rel/Urb/Eth signifies controls for religion, urban, and
ethnicity.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
